3/30/2023 0 Comments Mountain tanks![]() ![]() Opposition does not come from the civilian bureaucracy nor the political leadership of the country. Support for, or objection to the need for light tanks come primarily from within the ranks of the Army’s officer corps, both active and retired. Yet evidence of the PRC’s efforts to develop and deploy light tanks has not induced the IA to do likewise. The induction of light tanks should not be controversial, because it is neither an expensive investment nor a dispensable requirement especially when confronted with a neighbour such as the PRC, which has made a successful investment in light tanks and deploys them against India. Whither Indian Light Tanks: Reasons for Omission The paper concludes with recommendations on what should be done to address the light-tank deficit. It assesses the reasons why light tanks have not found traction with IA force planners evaluates why the PRC developed the Type 15 light tank and the nature of the tank’s capabilities and analyses the relative strengths and weaknesses of battle tanks operated by the IA and how they stack up against light tanks. This paper makes a case for acquiring light tanks as an integral component of the IA’s armoured forces. The realities of terrain and the constraints on guns of heavy tanks to engage targets at high altitudes mean that light tanks assume considerable importance. Although light tanks are not a panacea to deal with adversaries such as China, they are an essential element in the larger mix of capabilities, which will need to be fielded by the IA against its North Eastern foe. Today, like in many past acquisitions, the imperative to get a light tank is precipitated more by the ongoing Sino-Indian boundary crisis than by long-term planning with regard to the IA’s armoured forces. The crux of the problem lies in whether the IA needs light tanks as opposed to making do with inventory-heavy armoured combatants such as the Russian-built T-72s and the more modern T-90s. The ongoing boundary crisis with China has generated a debate about the importance of India developing and fielding light tanks against an adversary that has deployed purpose-built light tanks for high-altitude warfare. It is precisely this terrain’s role in enabling armoured operations that should serve as the rationale for acquiring light tanks. The 1962 Sino-Indian boundary war was another instance when French-built AMX light tanks were employed with great effectiveness against Chinese forces in Ladakh, especially in Chusul, that prevented the Chinese advance to Leh. As a senior officer of the IA noted in 2016 in Ladakh: “The vast flat valleys along the mountain ranges allow for armoured movement besides, there has been an increase in the force levels across the border as well.” The rarefied air with temperatures dipping below -45 degree Celsius in Zoji La is also comparable to what exists in Ladakh. Although extremely daunting and verging on the impossible given the steep gradients and the narrow paths on which tanks had to move at Zoji La, it was an inspired move reflecting great tactical and operational acumen. It is here that tanks were deployed and proved operationally effective on the snowy mountainous heights. There is not a single recorded case specifically during the Second World War of armour being used at the altitudes found in Zoji La. The Germans did it in Europe, in better terrain, I needed to attempt it here.” Zoji La was, and continues to be an inhospitable environment for the use of tanks, more than the terrain in Ladakh through which the Line of Actual Control (LAC) runs especially the Depsang Plains. The plan of opening Zoji La had, therefore, favoured a blitzkrieg. As General Kodendera Subbayya Thimmaya observed about tanks: “I had only a few weeks before…the onset of winter and heavy snow. For example, the IA used Sherman and Stuart light tanks against the Pakistan army in the 1947-1948 war at the Zojila Pass, which enabled the capture of Kargil. To be sure, experience with light tanks is not new for the IA. Medium and heavyweight tanks constitute a large component of the three strike corps of the IA geared for offensive operations against Pakistan. The IA’s predilection for medium and heavy tanks is largely due to the service’s preoccupation with India’s foe on its western border-i.e., Pakistan. The Indian Army (IA) has been historically biased in favour of medium- and heavyweight tanks, and there is an absence of a significant or at least a consequential light-tank component in its armoured corps. India remains locked in boundary tensions with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and although these crises have momentarily abated, India would need to seriously address the gaps in its ground armour against the PRC. Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology. ![]()
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